INFORMATION OPERATIONS: THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN GAINING INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
In this modern age of technology, the information element of power is seen by many as the solution to a multitude of problems, but it is not the 'holy grail' to solve all of them. Just as the U.S. national leadership has understood the importance of 
Information Operations Information Operations --Overview Overview
Organic IO Tools: Security Strategy states "democracy offers freedom of speech, independent media, and the marketplace of idea, which can expose and discredit falsehoods, prejudices, and dishonest propaganda." 4 The challenge becomes providing factual information to an audience that is swayed by misinformation and a concerted effort by adversaries to mislead. IO provides our military and government a capability to use information as a weapon system but balancing the military capability with the strategic communication can be confusing. Our own doctrine terminology adds to the confusion of how to
leverage information, what the military refers to, as a weapon system. The U.S.
military's use of information is focused on an adversary to disrupt their activities while influencing conduit targets from supporting adversaries. Protection of our own information assets while preventing adversaries from negatively influencing neutral audiences removes an invaluable resource from an enemy's arsenal.
Our adversaries are not held by the same legal and ethical reporting requirements that U.S. agencies are expected to uphold. The challenge is when the media and public cannot distinguish between information, misinformation or even disinformation. IO is the key tool which the military can use to counter misinformation and disinformation or use its capabilities to influence, disrupt or usurp an adversary's decision-making cycle. The hesitation for U.S. agencies to market our own actions to neutral or friendly audiences puts us at a distinct disadvantage. How does the U.S.
"sell" the truth or market its intentions to a target audience that is convinced that all our actions have ulterior motives or that we are attempting to mislead them? Attempts to market our efforts or to promote success are routinely seen with skepticism and concern by U.S. and foreign audiences.
Background on U.S. Information Operations
Although various elements of IO have been prevalent throughout the history of warfare it was during World War I that organized efforts emerged to harness the power of information. England's control of the trans-Atlantic cable gave the Allies the advantage in information control. The U.S. government's creation of the Committee on Public Information (CPI) gave the U.S. an instrument to not only counter propaganda but also a venue to influence international and national audiences. Utilizing strategic communication in its current form, the CPI "understood the task required to mobilize disparate elements of the population behind the war effort and the critical role information played...." 5 As WWI progressed; the need for an increased air capability became evident. The U.S.'s Aircraft Production Board developed a program to garner support and influence the political structure to assure approval of its efforts. Efforts included direct engagement with various American media outlets. The end result was a presidential signature to provide the required funds and support. 6 During WWII the U.S. government instituted the Office of War Information (OWI)
to aid in focusing information. This information effort was vital to the U.S.'s war effort to keep up moral of the American people and to bolster our allies. Although the U.S.'s propaganda effort was directed at the Axis powers, the development of programs to support the war effort was clearly directed at the American people. The purchase of war bonds and rationing programs, the movie industry's portrayal of the brave American
Soldier and the villainous enemy, and the short news clips highlighting U.S. victories were all efforts to influence and inform the U.S. population. These efforts were not IO but were forms of strategic communication, so how did the U.S. employ IO in WWII?
The "loose lips sinks ships" OPSEC programs, vast deception efforts, propaganda, and numerous other programs focused on the Axis leadership and enemy or neutral populations in a military effort to inform, influence and disrupt. To best employ IO one must understand IO, its elements and how they all "fit" there is a misconception that IO is just the coordinated application of PSYOP, CMO, and PA. 11 As stipulated in its definition, IO is the integrated employment of capabilities, not a single capability in its own right; IO is a means to enhance our efforts through a synchronized effort that supports and compliments its core, supporting, and related capabilities. foreign audiences, could not be disseminated at home." 13 The PSYOP community's ability to inform foreign audiences through a wide variety of information venues that includes satellite TV, radio, leaflets, and face-to-face engagements has provided an important ability to remove support from an adversary. As PSYOP continues to improve its dissemination means, the concern that PSYOP messaging could also potentially influence Americans increases.
Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
Many times the ability to inform a target audience of factual events is the best way to influence them. Today's target audience has access to international media, is probably familiar with the engagements conducted by U.S. representatives, and is personally connected to the events as they occur so any type of misleading messaging will be met with immediate skepticism. If there is a contradiction between the PSYOP products and other sources that the target sees as legitimate, credibility is lost. Without credibility, the PSYOP messaging is counterproductive. IO aids in maintaining the PSYOP credibility through its integration efforts, facilitating the messages that are at times common throughout the information effort. The stigma of PSYOP as a capability that is designed to mislead or unduly influence is a false perception. Legal constraints and cultural misunderstandings about the role of PSYOP in the overall information effort continue to add to the confusion of how to integrate information effectively. In today's media environment, the challenge of restricting messaging only to a foreign audience is difficult.
The recent challenges concerning the use of foreign media to influence specific target audiences clearly demonstrates the legal and ethical issues when faced with how to provide factual information in foreign media. The close coordination between PA and PSYOP to counter adversarial misinformation or disinformation is a purpose of the IO cell. 14 The capabilities and expertise of the PSYOP community provides the means to inform foreign audiences through a wide menu of communication venues. The 2005 revelation that the U.S. military was involved in the paid placement of news reports demonstrated a concern regarding the U.S. government's role in influencing audiences both foreign and internal. Although the stories placed in Iraqi newspapers were accepted as truthful, they were considered to only "present one side of events and omit information that might reflect poorly on the U.S. or Iraqi governments." 15 Immediately there were accusations of propaganda and a concern about the information spreading to domestic media. Although the organization that engineered the effort was not a PSYOP organization, the event highlights the concern of multiple organizations attempting to influence a foreign audience. It also highlights the issue of attempting to influence a foreign audience through media outlets.
Accusations that IO routinely takes credit for PSYOP products and success could be a direct result of the IO community's attempt to inform its leadership of ongoing 
Military Deception (MILDEC). The use of MILDEC is possibly one of the most
underutilized and misunderstood elements of IO. JP 3-13 states "MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrect analysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions." 24 The basic principle of MILDEC requires a believable and feasible foundation to be successful and it is the various tools of IO that help establish feasibility.
Deception infers falsehood, but that is not the case; however, it does require careful planning and information control. The hesitancy to utilize MILDEC relates to its need to be feasible and the resources required in facilitating success. The challenge is to dedicate resources to support the MILDEC without jeopardizing other operations and that requires commander guidance. A major risk when using information venues to support MILDEC is the loss of credibility; such a risk should not be taken lightly nor is it a requirement to jeopardize credibility to effectively support MILDEC. The use of OPSEC is extremely important when dealing with MILDEC, not to inform but to deny information. What provides credibility is presentation of word and deed but the most powerful resource is to present a truthful picture that supports the MILDEC.
Normally the most successful MILDEC operations provide a truthful picture, but putting various pictures together presents the adversary with a vision that is inaccurate.
Military history is filled with examples of deception; it is not a necessary ingredient to military success but it serves as a multiplier. Planners must assess military deception during the initial phases of planning to see if the risk and required resources are cost beneficial. In the current information environment exposure of an attempted deception is always a risk and access to vast amounts of information increases the risk of exposure. The second and third order of effects for exposure must be taken into consideration and plans must include how to react to exposure and how to mitigate it.
The common theme, just as with all the other core IO capabilities, is integration. It is said that the purpose of strategic communications is to "provide audiences with truthful and timely information that will influence them to support the objectives of the communicator. 26 Many times the communicator is the military, be it in a combat or 
Information Operations Related Elements

Public Affairs (PA)
.
Information Engagement (IE).
Although not a core element of IO, IE has gained prominence since the development of strategic communication and the growing impact that media has on the information environment. U.S. Army publications state that IE is "the integrated employment of public affairs to inform U.S. and friendly audiences; psychological operations, combat camera, U.S. government strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy, and other means necessary to influence foreign audiences; and, leader and Soldier engagements to support both efforts." 29 It is a concern that the Army's new Field Manual (FM) 3-13, may reinforce this perception that IE will replace IO in its description of the G7 and information tasks (see figure 3 ).
During Kosovo Forces operations in the Balkans, one of the primary means of engagements was the daily face-to-face interaction between Soldiers and the local populace. Key leader engagements were planned and executed with a desired end state to achieve specific effects. IE occurs at various levels and throughout the military structure; the orchestration of messages and themes aids in the "speaking with one voice". It is an implied task for the IO officer to plan and orchestrate IE for the Commander, but the execution is delegated to a wide variety of action organizations.
Key leaders, Soldiers, PA, PSYOP, CA, and others are all potential means to execute IE. is not always present.
The growing popularity of the effects concept also saw the rise and implementation of an effects element. These effects elements varied between the commands and were primarily personality driven. Just as important as it is for training to be standardized so is the use of the IO staff. Special staff or within the operations staff, the physical location of the IO organization is not the issue but the method of staff integration is important. The process of IO into the operational effort is critical so many
argue that the IO organization should be embedded in the operations staff.
Others are under the belief that IO as a special staff will enhance command 
Recommendations
The military's supporting role to the national government's objective to achieve information superiority is generally a success, but it can be improved. The following six recommendations, based on personal observations and experiences, would address many of the IO challenges facing U.S. military and civilian leadership.
1. The military IO career path must focus its efforts on preparing the IO officer to be familiar with all facets of the information tasks and on integrating these tasks to achieve information superiority.
2. Doctrine must be expanded to include improved methods of supporting the strategic communication effort without removing the technical aspects of IO.
3. IO officers in each of the services must be interchangeable; standardization in training and employment is key. As has been outlined in the IO Roadmap, "instruction for joint IO planners and specialists must be standardized" 37 6. Efforts to improve coordination between interagency and the military must include a more synchronized information effort. Implementing common themes, standardized training, employment techniques, and doctrine will aid the synchronization effort.
Conclusion
Achieving an operational advantage in regards to the information environment is feasible but in the modern information environment complete and constant dominance is not. IO cannot solve all U.S. information woes, but it can synchronize our efforts and present our audiences with a cohesive and effective communication tool. With all the various capabilities available to the U.S. in its efforts to gain superiority, efforts must remain focused and integrated at all levels, especially the national level. The use of IO as an integration process within the military structure is paramount. Just as a home is built using plumbers, electricians, carpenters, and masons working according to an integrated plan, IO must focus on the overall project, not a single piece of it. The perception that one particular capability or event can solve our problems is misleading.
It is a continuous effort; there will be periods of success and periods of failure. We must be poised to take advantage of the successes, while remaining ready to mitigate or correct apparent failures. 
